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Abstract Most previous empirical studies of price spillover effects of
foreclosure on no-default transactions are based on data from a
stable housing-market period. This study uses transactions for
2008 from a housing market with a relatively large number of
real estate owned (REO) sales/foreclosures. The overall results
indicate that: (1) REO and in the process of foreclosure
properties have the same spillover effects, but short sales do not
produce a spillover effect; (2) models that control for the overall
market trend produce smaller spillover effects; (3) the marginal
effect of an REO is 1%; (4) the cumulative effects of multiple
distressed neighbors can be as severe as 8%; and (5) excluding
transactions of homes that were sold under distress from the
sample increases the estimated marginal spillover effect to about
2% and the cumulative effects to about 21%.
The literature shows that mortgage defaults and resulting property foreclosures
generate a discount of about 7% to 24%, depending on location within the United
States (e.g., Shilling, Benjamin, and Sirmans, 1990; Forgey, Rutherford, and
VanBuskirk, 1994; Hardin and Wolverton, 1996; Springer, 1996; Carroll,
Clauretie, and Neill, 1997; Pennington-Cross, 2006; and Clauretie and
Daneshvary, 2008). More recently, several studies concentrated on the spillover
effects of foreclosed residential properties on the sales price of nearby
nondistressed properties (Immergluck and Smith, 2006; Lin, Rosenblatt, and Yao,
2008; Schuetz, Been, and Ellen, 2008; Harding, Rosenblatt, and Yao, 2009;
Leonard and Murdoch, 2009; and Rogers and Winter, 2009). Most indicate that
one or more foreclosed properties result in about a 1% or less effect on the
neighboring properties. These studies usually estimate the spillover effects by both
time and distance. All past studies have been based on a nondistressed sample
from a time period with a relatively stable housing market and small numbers of
distressed property transactions, and were conducted prior to 2008. For markets,
such as Las Vegas during 2008, when the market ‘‘crashed’’ and ﬁnancially
distressed transactions dominated the market, there was and continues to be180  Daneshvary, Clauretie, and Kader
additional competition for a limited number of buyers (a ‘‘thin’’ market).
Therefore, estimations of ‘‘short-term’’ spillover effects should include all
transactions, including those of distressed properties.
Furthermore, past studies of spillover effects do not control for the distressed
status of the sold properties, a property’s physical condition, and the endogenous
time-on-the-market that may affect transaction prices. In addition, none of the
studies have analyzed potential spillover differential effects between sales in the
process of foreclosure by borrowers and real estate owned (REO) sales by lenders
or estimated potential spillover effects of short-sale transactions.
The sale of a distressed property is usually done according to one of the following
options: (1) the lender allows a preforeclosure short sale by the borrower, (2) the
lender institutes the foreclosure process under a notice of default and the property
is sold during the process by the borrower, and (3) the lender forecloses on the
property, takes title, and sells the property in the market as REO. While previous
studies estimated foreclosure spillover, no study has estimated the size of discount
for houses sold under a short-sale status or separately estimated the effect of REO
or in process of foreclosure properties.1 The literature estimating own-price
discounts has shown signiﬁcant differences in the size of discount among the three
options. Do sales under different options also produce different spillover effects?
For example, one may expect either no spillover effect or a smaller-than-REO
effect of a short sale. The answer to this question has both private- and public-
policy implications.
This study advances the knowledge of the short-term spillover effects during a
severely ‘‘thin’’ market period. The study includes data for all single-family
detached home transactions in 2008 in Las Vegas, controls for the overall market
trend, the types of distressed property status (short sales, sales in the process of
foreclosure, and REO sales), a property’s physical condition, and the endogenous
time on market of each transaction. It estimates own-price discount and the
contemporaneous short-term (three-month and six-month) spillover effects for
three different distance rings.
Among other ﬁndings, the results show a marginal spillover effect of about 1%
from a distressed home sale that was sold as REO or sold in the process of
foreclosure up to three months prior to, and within 0.1 miles from, the sale of a
nondistressed home. Within the same time and distance, and controlling for the
overall market trend, the cumulative effects of multiple distressed properties is
about 8%. Without controlling for the price trend, the spillover effect is about
21%. Estimates of own-price discounts are from 10% to 19%, depending on the
type of distressed sale. Although short sales suffer from own-price discounts, they
do not have price spillover effects on their neighbors.
 Review of the Literature
Exhibit 1 presents a summary of the relevant literature on the issue of foreclosure






































































Time Boundary) Location Summary of Spillover Results
Immergluck and Smith
(2006)
Housing Policy Debate 1999 1997–1998/none Chicago 0.9% within 660 ft.
Lin et al. (2008) Journal of Real Estate
Finance and
Economics
2006 1990–2006/2–10 years Chicago 8.7% within 300 ft. and within 2 yrs. Only 1%
at 2,700 feet and within 3–5 yrs. Little effect
beyond 2,700 ft.
Schuetz et al. (2008) Journal of Housing
Economics
2000–2005 18 months or more prior
to the sale and after sale
of the affected property
New York Between 0.2 and 0.4% within 250 ft.,















1% within 200 yards and 6 mos. The effect
declines with time and space.
Harding et al. (2009) Journal of Urban
Economics
1989–2007 12 months prior and 24
months after the sale of
affected property
Seven MSAs Roughly 1% within 300 ft. around the time of
foreclosure.182  Daneshvary, Clauretie, and Kader
from determining the discount at which foreclosed properties sold to determining
the price spillover effect on neighboring properties. Immergluck and Smith (2006)
examined the effect of 1997–1998 distressed properties on a sample of 9,600
homes that were sold in Chicago in 1999. They concluded that, on average, for
each foreclosed property within 600 feet there was a 0.9% negative spillover effect
on the values of nondistressed properties.
Lin, Rosenblatt, and Yao (2008) estimated the spillover effect of foreclosed
properties on the neighboring property for Chicago. Using data on 1990–2006
foreclosed properties and year 2006 nondistressed sales, they found one of the
largest spillover effects in the literature. They found the spillover effect as large
as 8.7% for foreclosures within 300 feet and two years of liquidation. The effect
declined sharply within a distance of 2,700 feet and ﬁve years of liquidation.
Schuetz, Been, and Ellen (2008), using ﬁling for foreclosure records from 2000
to 2005 from New York, found a spillover effect of about 0.2% to 0.4%
(depending on the time span) within 250 feet distance. They also concluded that
one to ﬁve foreclosures within 500–1,000 feet had no signiﬁcant spillover effect,
but six or more foreclosures resulted in a 2.8% discount.
Using 2005–2006 home transaction data in Dallas, Leonard and Murdoch (2009)
estimate a 0.5% spillover effect from a home in some stage of the foreclosure
process within 250 feet of a nondistressed home. Rogers and Winters (2009) used
1998–2007 sales data from St. Louis and found a 1% decline in the prices of
nondistressed properties that were located within 200 yards and were sold six
months after a foreclosure transaction. The size of the spillover effect declined
with increases in distance and time. Harding, Rosenblatt, and Yao (2009) looked
at house prices in seven MSAs from 1989 through 2007 and found a 1% spillover
effect caused by foreclosed homes within a distance of 300 feet and around the
time of foreclosure. Moreover, they concluded the effect was proportional to the
number of nearby foreclosures.2
The above studies examined the spillover effects in various large cities during
mostly stable and/or up market periods, when there was not a large number of
foreclosures within relevant time and distance boundaries.3 Of course, the spillover
effects are different across different local economies and housing-market
conditions. Between early 2001 and 2007, Las Vegas was a ‘‘booming’’ city with
a strong house price appreciation rate. Since November 2007, Las Vegas has also
been among the hardest-hit economies and housing markets. From November 2007
to December 2008, price per square footage of single-family homes dropped by
about 40%. About 70% of single-family sales were sold under some sort of
distress. According to RealtyTrac, Nevada is ranked number one in foreclosure
rates, 1 out of every 76 homes is in foreclosure, followed by California with one
1 out of every 176 homes. The U.S. average is one out of every 466 homes. Thus,
the immediate or short-run spillover effect of distressed properties may have
important policy implications.
Most previous studies of spillover effects have estimated the effect of distressed
properties on a sample of nondistressed properties. They excluded distressed saleShort-Term Own-Price and Spillover Effects  183
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observations and did not control for distressed property status in their estimations.
Such analysis may be more appropriate for normal markets and time periods that
have a relative small portion of distressed housing transactions. For a ‘‘bad’’
market, such as Las Vegas in 2008, which has seen a domination of distressed
properties, to estimate accurately the marginal spillover effects of distressed
properties within a time and space distance on a nondistressed property, it is more
appropriate to include all transactions and their distressed status within a housing
market to obtain a correct ‘‘average’’ price of the entire market. The average price
in a market is inﬂuenced by all transactions.4 The current study uses samples that
include all transactions and contemporaneously estimates the immediate effect of
distressed properties on own-price discount, as well as the spillover effects of such
properties on nondistressed houses.
Also, none of the previous studies examined the role of distressed properties on
the time-on-market (TOM) of neighboring properties. Theoretically, distressed
status reduces the seller’s reservation price and, thus, TOM. Therefore, the effect
of distressed properties on own-price and price of nondistressed properties is both
direct and indirect, via TOM. As implicitly noted by Harding, Rosenblatt, and
Yao (2009), distressed properties create additional competition for a limited
number of buyers. This ‘‘thin market’’ not only affects the prices of nondistressed
properties but also the length of time that such properties stay on the market. The
search theory predicts a positive price-TOM relationship. Previous empirical
studies, however, have found a negative relationship. This negative relationship
has been attributed to a ‘‘stigma’’ effect of prolonged TOM (Jud, Seaks, and
Winkler, 1996). A very plausible explanation of the negative relationship is offered
by Huang and Palmquist (2001). In investigating a highway-noise effect on price
and TOM, they found that market duration has a signiﬁcant negative impact on
the sales price. They concluded that as the TOM increases, sellers adjust their
reservation price, resulting in an observed negative price-TOM relationship.
This paper concentrates on the short-term contemporaneous own-price discount
and the spillover effects of three types of distressed properties: (1) short sales, (2)
sales in the process of foreclosure, and (3) sales after lender’s repossession (REO),
using samples of complete counts for distressed and nondistressed properties and
controlling for property’s physical condition. Both space and time boundaries are
used to provide estimations of the spillover effects.
 Empirical Analysis
Foreclosure Process in Nevada
Foreclosure is one of several outcomes of mortgage default. When a borrower
becomes delinquent on a residential loan and has no desire or ability to keep the
property, then the loss mitigation involves a short sale, a sale in the process of
foreclosure, or an REO sale. The process can start either under judicial foreclosure184  Daneshvary, Clauretie, and Kader
or nonjudicial foreclosure. Judicial foreclosure can take place only in the absence
of a sale clause in the loan document and when the lender sues the borrower in
order to obtain a decree of foreclosure and order of sale. Judicial process is rarely
used in Nevada. The most common practice in Nevada is nonjudicial foreclosure
under which the ‘‘power of sale’’ clause allows the lender to sell the property to
recover the mortgage balance. Upon default, the lender must issue a ‘‘Notice of
Default and Election to Sell’’ to the borrower.
The lender also has the option of allowing a house to be sold by the borrower as
a short sale at a price lower than the outstanding loan amount. The agreement can
take place either before or after a ‘‘Notice of Default and Election to Sell’’ is
issued and the foreclosure process is initiated but not ﬁnalized. The sale proceeds
from the short sale would be remitted to the lender, even if the net proceeds were
less than the mortgage balance. Although the lender could still enforce a deﬁciency
judgment, most lenders are willing to fully discharge all mortgage debt and agree
to limit the damage to the homeowner’s credit. The short sale has certain
advantages for the lender, the most obvious of which is avoiding additional
carrying and transaction costs and the legal expenses of foreclosure or REO from
the default to the ﬁnal sale of the property. One disadvantage of a short sale is
an agency cost; the borrower will have no incentive to maximize the sales price
because in most short sales the deﬁciency judgment is usually waived. In the data
set, there is an indicator showing the properties that were sold as a short sale,
distinguishing them from houses that were sold in the process of foreclosure.
Nonetheless, short sales are sales by motivated sellers under ﬁnancial distress.
They most likely sell with a discount and may produce a spillover effect on the
neighborhood prices.
After a Notice of Default has been recorded and the lender has begun the
foreclosure process, the law requires a minimum of three months from the time
of notice before a sale is conducted by the lender. During the waiting period, the
borrower may sell the house and remit the proceeds to the lender. Such a house
is sold by the borrower while in the process of foreclosure and before it becomes
a REO property. If a sale by the borrower has not been conducted during the three
months after the notice has been issued, a sale is conducted by the lender. At the
sale date, the lender usually bids an amount equal to the balance due plus costs.
If the sale generates a nonlender successful bidder, the property is sold as a sale
in the process of foreclosure. If the sale does not generate a nonlender bidder, the
property reverts to the lender, and then is sold by the lender with an REO status.
There is no statutory right of redemption in Nevada and the debtor cannot regain
possession. It is important to note that these properties are not sold as foreclosed,
but as REO by a lender/bank.
Data
The data set for the empirical estimation includes all detached single-family
houses sold between December 2007 and December 2008 out of the MultipleShort-Term Own-Price and Spillover Effects  185
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No-Default Short Sale Repo & foreclosed Total
Sources: Greater Las Vegas Association of Realtors (GLVAR) and Multiple Listing Services (MLS).
Listing Services (MLS) sponsored by the Greater Las Vegas Association of
Realtors (GLVAR). Beginning with December 2007, the GLVAR provides
information that shows whether the property was sold as a normal sale (no-
default), a short sale, in process of foreclosure, or an REO. Variables short sale
and REO were not available prior to December 2007. Thus, the analysis pertains
to a down-turned housing market. The data set is restricted to properties that sold
up to $2,000,000 in the ZIP Codes representing the Las Vegas MSA. The ﬁnal
sample consists of 7,017 regular sales (no default), 1,060 sales in the process of
foreclosure, 2,185 short sales, and 12,270 repossessed sales (REO), a total of
22,532 single-family properties. There are data for 13 months. Observations from
the ﬁrst three months (2,828) are used to create the neighborhood three-month
rings. Thus, the analyses are based on data for the last 10 months of 2008, a total
of 19,704 observations.5
Exhibit 2 depicts the monthly number of transactions from March to December
2008 by type of sale. The total number of sales steadily increased from March to
the end of July and shows a declining trend thereafter. This turnaround in sales
is perhaps a reﬂection of the nationwide liquidity crisis that started in the summer
of 2008. As expected, the number of repo-foreclosure sales dominated the market.
The number of short sales also increased until July and stayed almost at the same186  Daneshvary, Clauretie, and Kader
























No-Default Short Sale Repo & Foreclosed
Sources: Greater Las Vegas Association of Realtors (GLVAR) and Multiple Listing Services (MLS).
level for the rest of the year. The number of no-default sales declined steadily
from 686 to 294.
Exhibit 3 shows the sales price per square foot for no-default, short sale, and repo-
foreclosed sales. Price per square foot of no-default sales increased from March
to the end of May and shows a linear declining trend thereafter. From March to
December prices declined by about 13%. Prices of short sales and repo-foreclosed
sales steadily declined from March to December, respectively 23% and 25%.
Exhibit 4 reveals two interesting facts. First, the three trends are almost parallel,
indicating that at least in the short run there is a ‘‘constant’’ or ‘‘intercept shift’’
of own-price discount for distressed properties. This also implies that empirical
analyses based on a sample of no-default transactions-only will not reﬂect ‘‘true
average’’market prices and may produce an overestimate of spillover effects. Such
analyses, exclusive of default transactions, assume that the spillover effects apply
only to no-default sales. The empirical analyses relax this assumption and show
potential overestimations of the spillover effects that are the result of using
samples of nondistressed properties only. Of course, as shown by Harding,
Rosenblatt, and Yao (2009), due to ignored maintenance, there is a contagion
effect of distressed properties on the sale of nondistressed properties. If
distributions of a property’s physical condition are signiﬁcantly different between
the distressed and nondistressed properties, then not including some measures ofShort-Term Own-Price and Spillover Effects  187
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Exhibit 4  Property’s Physical Condition: By Type of Sale
Default Resulting
Condition Total No Default Short Sale Foreclosed Repo
Excellent 0.170 0.504 0.237 0.063 0.035
Good 0.610 0.430 0.615 0.735 0.673
Fair 0.198 0.059 0.137 0.163 0.264
Poor 0.022 0.008 0.012 0.039 0.028
Observations 19,704 4,796 2,014 638 12,256
Note: The sources are the Greater Las Vegas Association of Realtors (GLVAR) and Multiple Listing
Services (MLS).
property condition and using a sample of all transactions would confound the
spillover effects.
Exhibit 4 shows property conditions by type of sales, as assessed by the listing
agent. Not surprisingly, distributions of the subsamples with respect to property
conditions are signiﬁcantly different. About 7% of no-default homes and about
29% of repossessed homes were assessed as being in ‘‘poor’’ or ‘‘fair’’ condition.
On the other hand, about 93% of no-default homes and 71% of repossessed homes
were assessed as being in ‘‘good’’ or ‘‘excellent’’ condition. The percentage of
properties assessed as in ‘‘good’’ or ‘‘excellent’’ condition decline steadily from
no-defaults to short to foreclosed to repossessed sales.
The Model
Building on the existing literature, a hedonic pricing model is used to estimate
the own-price discount and spillover effects of three types of distressed properties:
a short sale, a sale in the process of foreclosure, and an REO sale.6 The general
hedonic model recognizes the house selling price as a function of the house and
neighborhood characteristics. The modiﬁed hedonic model that accounts for sale
under distress, the spillover effect of distressed sales, the market price trend, and
TOM can be expressed as:
P  X   Z   (STI)  (TSDC)  T  (TOM)  u , 1 x 1 z 1
(1)188  Daneshvary, Clauretie, and Kader
where P is an n  1 vector of selling price (in natural log); X1 is an n  k matrix
of k house characteristics affecting price; Z1 is an n  g matrix of g neighborhood
characteristics affecting price; (STI)i sa nn  3 vector of selling-type indicator
(short sale, in foreclosure process, and REO); (TSDC)i sa nn  l matrix of the
neighborhood counts of the three types of distressed properties and their squared
values, measured at l time and distance boundaries; T is a monthly time trend
to control for current price trends;7 (TOM)i sa nn  1 vector of TOM; u1 is an
n  1 vector of regression disturbances; and x, z, , , , and  are the estimated
parameters.
Generally speaking, a mortgage default decision is usually triggered by a reduction
in income and cash ﬂow due to events such as divorce, loss of job, and serious
illness. Theoretically, it is also possible that a general decline in housing prices
reduces the loan-to-value ratios creating a negative home equity. For example, a
recent work by Pennington-Cross (2010) found that the duration of foreclosures
depends on contemporaneous housing market conditions, such as declining
property values. Thus, the incidence of default/foreclosure may depend on both
the incidence of income interruption and the distribution of loan-to-equity ratios.8
This discussion also raises the possibility that house price and selling-type
indicators in equation (1) are jointly determined, implying that (STI) indicators
are endogenous variables in the price equation. Such endogeniety is examined
below.
The search and/or ‘‘stigma’’ theories suggest and the most recent empirical
literature shows, that not only does the TOM affects the reservation and transaction
prices, but also the seller’s choice of listing and reservation prices as well,
indicating that TOM is an endogenous variable in the price equation. Thus,
simultaneous estimations of price and TOM equations are deemed appropriate.9
The TOM equation can be expressed as:
TOM  X   (P)  (STI)	  (TSDC)
  T  u , (2) 22
where X2 is an n  m matrix of m exogenous variables affecting TOM, u2 is an
n  1 vector of regression disturbances, and , , 	, 
, and  are regression
parameters. Separate ordinary least squares (OLS) estimations of equations (1)
and (2) assume that all of the right-hand-side variables, including TOM (in
equation 1) and price (in equation 2), are exogenous. Of course, these variables
are endogenous, correlated with their respective disturbance, and OLS estimators
are inconsistent. The traditional two-stage least squares (2SLS) instrumental
variable estimators are consistent but do not use information from cross-equation
correlations of disturbances, u1 and u2, producing inefﬁcient estimates.
To account for endogeniety of the price and TOM variables and to utilize
information from the cross-equation correlations of disturbances, Green (2003, pp.
404–07) suggests a three-stage least squares (3SLS) estimation method. In theShort-Term Own-Price and Spillover Effects  189
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ﬁrst stage, each endogenous variable is predicted using all exogenous variables in
the system. In the second stage, the predicted values of the endogenous variable,
as well as other equation-speciﬁc exogenous variables, are included as explanatory
variables in each equation (i.e., predicted values of TOM for the price equation
and predicted values of the price for the TOM equation). Residuals from the
second stage are then used to obtain a consistent estimate of the covariance matrix
of the two disturbances. Using this consistent estimate of the covariance matrix
and generalized least squares (GLS), consistent and efﬁcient estimates of the
parameters of the system of the two equations can be obtained.
The count of distressed sales, by types of distressed types, that neighbor a
nondistressed sale are needed to estimate the spillover effects. This requires the
creation of relevant time and space boundaries. After considering previous
research and the population density of Las Vegas, the number of distressed
properties that sold within the past three months and within 0.1 miles (528 feet),
0.25 miles (1,320 feet), and 0.5 miles (2,640 feet) of each observation are
determined.10 That is, three separate mutually exclusive rings are created: from
zero to 0.1 miles, from 0.1 to 0.25 miles, and from 0.25 to 0.5 miles. In addition,
the numbers for within the past six months of each observation are determined
and an analysis is conducted for both a three-month and a six-month time frame.
Eighteen variables (three types of distressed for three distance rings, and for two
time frames) and their squared value are added to each observation in the data
set. Nonlinearity of the relationships is investigated below.
Variables
The natural logarithm of selling price, equation (1), is modeled as a function of
the physical characteristics of a house, (X1), neighborhood characteristics, (Z1),
and marketing time (TOM). In addition, the current price trend is controlled by
including monthly time trend (T). Indicators for a short sale, a sale in the process
of foreclosure, and REO (STI) are included to estimate own-price discount and
potential spillover effects on neighbors, along with a vector of the three types of
distressed property counts within the distance and time frame described before,
(TSDC), and their square values to test for nonlinearity.
In addition to variables typically found in previous hedonic models, the physical
characteristics vector includes property condition (excellent, good, fair, and poor)
recorded by the listing agent, and some unique characteristics of the Las Vegas
Valley, such as various house views (see Exhibit 5). Furthermore, property-
occupancy status indicators such as vacant, owner occupied, and tenant occupied
are also included. Often distressed properties are sold as cash transactions.
Previous research shows a cash discount for such transactions. The model includes
an indicator reﬂecting cash versus mortgage transactions.
The neighborhood characteristics vector includes the percentage of population
ages 25–35, percentage of population age 55 or older, percentage of population190  Daneshvary, Clauretie, and Kader
Exhibit 5  Deﬁnition and Descriptive Statistics of Variables
Three-Month Spillover Six-Month Spillover
Variables Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
Selling Status
The property was sold with no
default (%)
0.243 0.204
The property was sold as a short
sale (%)
0.102 0.111
The property was sold in the
process of foreclosure (%)
0.032 0.016
The property was sold as an
REO (%)
0.622 0.668
Number of Neighbors by Sale
Status
No. of short sale neighbors: 0–
0.1 miles distance
0.122 0.381 0.233 0.555
No. of short sale neighbors:
0.1–0.25 miles distance
0.418 0.778 0.803 1.183
No. of short sale neighbors:
0.25–0.5 miles distance
1.073 1.385 2.060 2.185
No. of neighbors sold in the
process of foreclosure: 0–0.1
miles distance
0.068 0.277 0.132 0.386
No. of neighbors sold in the
process of foreclosure:
0.1–0.25 miles distance
0.231 0.552 0.458 0.822
No. of neighbors sold in the
process of foreclosure:
0.25–0.5 miles distance
0.579 1.001 1.177 1.508
No. of neighbors sold as REO:
0–0.1 miles distance
0.772 1.245 1.549 2.022
No. of neighbors sold as REO:
0.1–0.25 miles distance
2.516 2.918 5.038 4.863
No. of neighbors sold as REO:
0.25–0.5 miles distance
6.380 6.280 12.825 10.759
Selling Price Net of Seller’s
Contribution to Closing Costs
$245,232 $145,725 $234,231 $139,776
Price per Square Footage $117.50 $34.36 $112.61 $32.36
Days on Market 67.964 77.471 65.015 76.950
Property Physical Condition
Indicators (assessed by the listing
agent)
Condition poor 0.022 0.023
Condition fair 0.198 0.206
Condition good 0.610 0.612
Condition excellent 0.170 0.159Short-Term Own-Price and Spillover Effects  191
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Exhibit 5  (continued)
Deﬁnition and Descriptive Statistics of Variables
Three-Month Spillover Six-Month Spillover




Occupied by owner 0.124 0.119
Occupied by a tenant 0.014 0.014
Sold Cash 0.157 0.164
Property’s Physical Characteristics
Property age 10.554 10.372 10.744 10.607
Building square footage 2,092 814 2,083 824
Lot square footage 6,583 4,656 6,539 4,539
Number of bedrooms 3.469 0.797 3.472 0.794
Number of bathrooms 2.795 0.753 2.791 0.757
Number of garages 2.150 0.730 2.134 0.745
Property has a ﬁreplace 0.643 0.641
Property has a pool 0.192 0.192
Property has a spa 0.127 0.124
Two-story building 1.578 1.579
Has golf course view 0.016 0.013
Has mountain view 0.133 0.122
Has strip view 0.018 0.015
Has park view 0.009 0.008
Has city view 0.028 0.025
Has lake view 0.002 0.002
Property’s Neighborhood
Characteristics
Percentage age 25–35 26.132 8.127 26.248 8.108
Percentage age 55 or older 36.753 10.995 36.585 10.803
Percentage with a high school
diploma
53.665 6.558 53.911 6.500
Percentage with a college degree 40.648 9.326 40.212 9.418
Percentage with a child at home 31.180 7.480 31.289 7.515
Summerlin 0.058 0.055
Anthem 0.030 0.025
Lake Las Vegas 0.001 0.001
Seven Hills 0.009 0.009
The Lakes 0.006 0.005
Commission and Agents’
Characteristics Factors
Commission rate paid to buyer’s
agent
3.026 0.472 3.014 0.460
Commission is variable 0.188 0.184192  Daneshvary, Clauretie, and Kader
Exhibit 5  (continued)
Deﬁnition and Descriptive Statistics of Variables
Three-Month Spillover Six-Month Spillover
Variables Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
Listing agent’s no. of listings
above average
0.322 0.321
Property listed and sold by the
same agent
0.045 0.042
Notes: The sources are the Greater Las Vegas Association of Realtors (GLVAR) and Multiple Listing
Services (MLS). The number of observations for three-month spillover is 19,704; the number of
observations for six-month spillover is 14,605.
with a high school diploma and percentage with a college degree, and percentage
of households with a child at home, all measured on January of 2008. The vector
includes location indicators for ﬁve upscale large-planned communities
(Summerlin, Anthem, Lake Las Vegas, Seven Hills, and the Lakes).11
In addition to vectors (P), (STI), and (TSDC), the length of time needed to
generate an acceptable offer, TOM in equation (2), depends on vector (X2). Among
other variables, vector (X2) includes the property’s physical condition and
occupancy status variables that are also included in the price equation. TOM also
is inﬂuenced by the broker’s effort level and the listing agent’s characteristics.
Actual broker effort is unobservable, but depends on the commission rates offered
to listing and buyer agents (Sirmans Turnbull, and Benjamin, 1991). The
commission incentive is accounted for by including an indicator that measures
whether the listing commission is a variable rate versus a ﬂat rate (the total
commission rate that is a part of the listing contract is not available). The buyer’s
agent commission rate is also included. Of course, an agent’s experience, skill,
training, and expertise are important in identifying potential buyers and making
faster sales (Yang and Yavas, 1995; and Jud, Seaks, and Winkler, 1996). Thus, a
proxy is included for the agent’s years of experience in the local market, whether
the property was listed and sold by the same agent, and if the listing agent’s total
number of listings was above the average listings by all agents.12 Together these
three variables and the two commission rate variables satisfy the exclusionary
condition for estimating the endogenous TOM variable of the price equation. It
should be noted that the primary goal is to estimate own-price discount and
spillover price effects of distressed properties. The TOM analysis is included to
account for potential indirect effects on prices via TOM.
Variable names and descriptive statistics for the sample of three-month and six-
month spillover estimations are provided in Exhibit 5. Exhibit shows that about
two-thirds of the properties were sold under some sort of distress. The portion ofShort-Term Own-Price and Spillover Effects  193
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distressed sales increased over time, the three-month spillover sample (the last ten
months of 2008) compared with the six-month spillover sample (the last seven
months of 2008). Average numbers of all three types of distressed neighbors
increased with increased distance, due to a larger area of the outer rings, and with
an increased time frame. The overall average number of distressed neighbor sales
was 12.1 for the three-month spillover sample and 24.2 for the six-month spillover
sample.
As expected, the average property sale prices show a declining trend, reduced
from $245,232 to $234,231 and from $117.5 per square foot to $112.6 per square
foot. A comparison of the two samples shows that the marketing time declined
by about three days. The average property had a lot of about 6,500 square feet,
about 2,080 square feet of living space, and was about 10 years old. As Exhibit
5 indicates, there are similar distributions between the two samples with respect
to property and neighborhood characteristics, occupancy status, and property
condition.
 Results
As mentioned before there is a possibility that house price and sales-type
indicators in equation (1) are jointly determined. In that case, the indicator
variables, (STI), are endogenous in the price equation and may not sufﬁciently
control for possible latent characteristics of the distressed properties. For example,
if distressed properties have ‘‘unknown’’stigma attached to them, then OLS would
underestimate the negative effect of distressed-type variables. The type of sale
decision is endogenized by applying an endogenous treatment effect model. A
dichotomous variable is created that is equal to one if the house was sold as a
distressed property and is equal to zero otherwise.
Estimation of a two-equation system, the continuous price and the probit treatment
effect equations, correct for any self-selection bias and endogeniety of the decision
to sell a house as distressed property (Heckman, 1979; and Vella and Verbeek,
1999). The estimation of the probit equation includes all the right-hand side
variables in the price equation (except STI indicators) and the following two
variables: the number of homes and the number of occupied homes in the
neighborhood as deﬁned by ZIP Code.13 From the results of the probit model, the
inverse Mills ratio for each observation is estimated and included, along with the
indicator variable for distressed status, as an independent variable in the price
equation.
The above methodology was applied to both the three-month and 6-month data.
The estimated coefﬁcients of the inverse Mills ratio were negative, small in size,
and statistically insigniﬁcant. In addition, the estimated correlation of error terms
across equations, , were also highly insigniﬁcant. These ﬁndings may be the
result of the weak exclusionary variables.
Exhibits 6 and 7 report the OLS and the 3SLS estimated results for the natural

































Exhibit 6  Ordinary Least Squares and Three-Stage Least Squares Estimation of the Log of Selling Price: Three-Months Spillover
OLS (1) OLS (2) 3SLS
Variables Coeff. t-Stat. Coeff. t-Stat. Coeff. t-Stat.
Monthly time trend 0.0228 47.67*** 0.0234 43.28***
Months on Market 0.0005 1.11 0.0003 0.77 0.0184 3.85***
Number of Neighbors by Sale Status
No. of neighbors sold in the process of foreclosure/REO:
0–0.1 miles distance
0.0200 10.22*** 0.0107 5.76*** 0.0106 5.46***
No. of neighbors sold in the process of foreclosure/REO:
0–0.1 miles distance squared
0.0019 5.69*** 0.0009 2.66*** 0.0008 2.40**
No. of neighbors sold in the process of foreclosure/REO:
0.1–0.25 miles distance
0.0125 11.61*** 0.0068 6.66*** 0.0074 6.87***
No. of neighbors sold in the process of foreclosure/REO:
0.1–0.25 miles distance squared
0.0007 8.10*** 0.0003 4.29*** 0.0004 4.45***
No. of neighbors sold in the process of foreclosure/REO:
0.25–0.5 miles distance
0.0105 19.38*** 0.0041 7.67*** 0.0040 7.26***
No. of neighbors sold in the process of foreclosure/REO:
0.25–0.5 miles distance squared
0.0003 13.62*** 0.0001 5.20*** 0.0001 4.83***
No. of short sale neighbors: 0–0.1 miles distance 0.0063 0.98 0.0054 0.89 0.0045 0.71
No. of short sale neighbors: 0–0.1 miles distance squared 0.0047 1.36 0.0022 0.68 0.0019 0.57
No. of short sale neighbors: 0.1–0.25 miles distance 0.0018 0.60 0.0040 1.39 0.0025 0.84
No. of short sale neighbors: 0.1–0.25 miles distance squared 0.0013 1.42 0.0010 1.12 0.0011 1.22
No. of short sale neighbors: 0.25–0.5 miles distance 0.0023 1.20 0.0040 2.20** 0.0033 1.72*































































Exhibit 6  (continued)
Ordinary Least Squares and Three-Stage Least Squares Estimation of the Log of Selling Price: Three-Months Spillover
OLS (1) OLS (2) 3SLS
Variables Coeff. t-Stat. Coeff. t-Stat. Coeff. t-Stat.
Sale Type:
Sold as a ‘‘short’’ sale 0.1194 26.18*** 0.1023 23.60*** 0.0929 17.76***
Sold in the process of foreclosure 0.1088 15.25*** 0.1324 19.56*** 0.1470 18.50***
Sold as an REO (lender owned) 0.1447 39.05*** 0.1320 37.54*** 0.1539 22.69***
Property’s Physical Condition:
Condition poor 0.2265 25.65*** 0.2338 27.97*** 0.2269 25.84***
Condition fair 0.0805 17.60*** 0.0858 19.81*** 0.0837 18.55***
Condition good 0.0389 10.46*** 0.0439 12.47*** 0.0432 11.79***
Adjusted R2 0.8784 0.8910 0.8817
Notes: The table covers the full sample (19,605 observations from June to December 2008). In addition to the included variables, each speciﬁcation includes
the house and neighborhood characteristics, vacancy status, and cash transaction indicator variables. Estimated coefﬁcients of these variables for all
speciﬁcations, as well as those for the TOM equation for the 3SLS estimation, are available upon requests.
*Signiﬁcant at the 10% level.
**Signiﬁcant at the 5% level.

































Exhibit 7  Ordinary Least Squares and Three-Stage Least Squares Estimation of the Log of Selling Price: Six-Months Spillover
OLS (1) OLS (2) 3SLS
Variables Coeff. t-Stat. Coeff. t-Stat. Coeff. t-Stat.
Monthly Time Trend 0.0263 36.7*** 0.0269 33.61***
Months on Market 0.0002 0.35 0.0007 1.39 0.0272 4.86***
Number of Neighbors by Sale Status 0.0136 8.68*** 0.0084 5.62*** 0.0086 5.33***
No. of neighbors sold in the process of foreclosure/REO:
0–0.1 miles distance
0.0006 3.83*** 0.0003 2.18*** 0.0004 2.15**
No. of neighbors sold in the process of foreclosure/REO:
0–0.1 miles distance squared
0.0086 10.57*** 0.0066 8.50*** 0.0070 8.31***
No. of neighbors sold in the process of foreclosure/REO:
0.1–0.25 miles distance
0.0002 6.84*** 0.0002 5.59*** 0.0002 5.57***
No. of neighbors sold in the process of foreclosure/REO:
0.1–0.25 miles distance squared
0.0060 15.71*** 0.0039 10.45*** 0.0038 9.55***
No. of neighbors sold in the process of foreclosure/REO:
0.25–0.5 miles distance
0.0001 10.13*** 0.0001 7.46*** 0.0001 6.74***
No. of neighbors sold in the process of foreclosure/REO:
0.25–0.5 miles distance squared
0.0014 0.29 0.0081 1.79 0.0063 1.29
No. of short sale neighbors: 0–0.1 miles distance 0.0029 1.59 0.0009 0.51 0.0011 0.56
No. of short sale neighbors: 0–0.1 miles distance squared 0.0034 1.4 0.0057 2.49 0.0034 1.34
No. of short sale neighbors: 0.1–0.25 miles distance 0.0005 1.14 0.0005 1.09 0.0005 1.08
No. of short sale neighbors: 0.1–0.25 miles distance squared 0.0043 2.75*** 0.0073 4.86** 0.0063 3.92***
No. of short sale neighbors: 0.25–0.5 miles distance 0.0002 1.01 0.0002 1.18 0.0002 0.97































































Exhibit 7  (continued)
Ordinary Least Squares and Three-Stage Least Squares Estimation of the Log of Selling Price: Six-Months Spillover
OLS (1) OLS (2) 3SLS
Variables Coeff. t-Stat. Coeff. t-Stat. Coeff. t-Stat.
Sale Type
Sold as a ‘‘short’’ sale 0.1207 22.84*** 0.1134 22.43*** 0.0999 15.99***
Sold in the process of foreclosure 0.1291 11.62*** 0.1414 13.29*** 0.1632 13.21***
Sold as an REO (lender owned) 0.1541 33.7*** 0.1545 35.31*** 0.1900 21.6***
Property’s Physical Condition
Condition poor 0.2391 23.58*** 0.2411 24.84*** 0.2264 20.99***
Condition fair 0.0764 14.18*** 0.0769 14.92*** 0.0698 12.22***
Condition good 0.0347 7.79*** 0.0356 8.36*** 0.0322 6.93***
Adj. R2 0.8839 0.8937 0.8744
Notes: The table covers the full sample (14,605 observations from June to December 2008). In addition to the included variables, each speciﬁcation includes
the house and neighborhood characteristics, vacancy status, and cash transaction indicator variables. Estimated coefﬁcients of these variables for all
speciﬁcations, as well as those for the TOM equation for the 3SLS estimation, are available upon requests.
*Signiﬁcant at the 10% level.
**Signiﬁcant at the 5% level.
***Signiﬁcant at the 1% level.198  Daneshvary, Clauretie, and Kader
include only the estimated coefﬁcients of interest. Coefﬁcient estimates of property
and neighborhood characteristics, as well as other control variables (32 in all), are
not reported but are available upon request. The coefﬁcients of these variables are
statistically signiﬁcant, have the expected signs, are robust across samples, and
are consistent with the ﬁndings of previous research. Estimated coefﬁcients of the
TOM equation are also not reported but are available upon request. These
estimates indicate that, ceteris paribus, the higher the price the longer the
marketing time. Distressed neighbors do not have a signiﬁcant spillover effect on
the marketing time. Properties with a short-sale status take 17 days more than no-
default properties to sell. Properties in the process of foreclosure and REO sell
25 and 40 days, respectively, quicker than no-default properties. Marketing time
is impacted by a property’s physical condition. Vacant homes take longer to sell.
All variables related to the agent’s characteristics are signiﬁcant.
Results of three speciﬁcations are reported in Exhibit 6 and 7. To provide a
baseline for a comparison that allows investigation of the potential bias in the
estimated spillover effects that may arise from not isolating the overall market
price trend and the endogeniety of the TOM, speciﬁcation (1) provides OLS
estimates of the price equation without the time trend variable. Speciﬁcation (2)
provides OLS estimates with the time trend variable added to the model.
Speciﬁcation (3) is the result of 3SLS that endogenize the TOM variable.15
Starting with Exhibit 6, speciﬁcation (1), an additional REO property that was
sold within the last three months and within 0.1 miles from a nondistressed
property has about a 2.0% (albeit declining) negative spillover effect. The effect
declines to 1.2% and 1.0% as distance is increased to between 0.1 and 0.25 miles
and between 0.25 and 0.5 miles, respectively.16 The coefﬁcients of short-sale
counts have the expected negative signs but are insigniﬁcant both statistically and
in magnitude. The coefﬁcients of the three types of properties’ distress status are
all highly signiﬁcant. A short sale has a discount of 11.3%, a sale in the process
of foreclosure has a discount of 10.3%, and an REO sale is discounted by 13.5%.
The coefﬁcients of the variables of a property’s physical condition are signiﬁcant
and economically meaningful. Relative to a property in excellent condition, a
property in good condition is sold with about a 3.8% discount. The discount
increases to about 20.3% for a property in poor condition.
Controlling for the overall market trend, speciﬁcation (2), reduces the negative
spillover effect of REO in all three distance rings by almost one-half. The spillover
effects are now about 1.1%, 0.68%, and 0.041%, respectively.17 Short-sale
spillovers are still insigniﬁcant and economically meaningless. Inclusion of time
trend does not signiﬁcantly alter the size of own-price discounts associated with
sale type or property condition. The coefﬁcient of time trend itself is highly
signiﬁcant and indicates an average overall market price decline of about 2.3%
per month.18 The OLS estimate of the TOM variable in speciﬁcations (1) and (2)
are both economically and statistically insigniﬁcant, perhaps due to the
endogeniety of this variable.Short-Term Own-Price and Spillover Effects  199
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The ﬁnal speciﬁcation in Exhibit 6 reports the results of the 3SLS estimates that
endogenize the TOM variable. Notice that there is no meaningful change in the
size or signiﬁcance of the estimated coefﬁcients of spillover effects, the sale type,
or property condition variables.19 The coefﬁcient of TOM, however, is now highly
signiﬁcant, indicating an average decline of about 1.8% for each additional month
that a property stayed on the market. This ﬁnding is consistent with those of
previous research, see Endnote 9.
Based on the results of the three-month time frame, the model that includes the
number of distressed neighbors and its square value, property distressed status,
property’s physical condition, extended house and neighborhood characteristics,
the time trend, and endogenized TOM produces the most accurate estimates of
spillover effects for the Las Vegas market and for the period under consideration.
There are signiﬁcant own-price discount and spillover effects from REO. On the
other hand, while short-sale properties are themselves sold with an own-price
discount, they do not have spillover effects on neighbors. In fact, this pattern of
signiﬁcant own-price discount but no spillover effect of short sale is repeated in
all the estimated models and samples.
Exhibit 7 reports the results of identical speciﬁcations as Exhibit 6, except it
estimates the six-month spillover effects. The estimates are statistically highly
signiﬁcant, with correct signs, and are robust across speciﬁcations. The overall
pattern of results is very similar to that in Exhibit 6, including the pattern of
differences between the OLS and the 3SLS results. However, the coefﬁcients of
the own-price discounts are slightly higher for all three forms of distressed
properties. As expected, the sizes of the spillover coefﬁcients are smaller, due to
a further time lapse. Moving from three months to six months, the spillover effect
of the closest distance ring drops by about 19% (1.06% vs. 0.86%).
As discussed before, exclusion of distressed properties from the analysis, as is
done by most past research, may produce a potential biased estimate due to
nonrandom sample selection (self-selection) or incidental truncation. For
comparison to past research, however, the 3SLS model is applied to samples that
exclude REO and foreclosed observations. Exhibit 8 reports the results for three-
month and six-month time frames. The same as nonrestricted samples, all spillover
variables are statistically signiﬁcant, but compared to the nonrestricted sample,
the size of the spillover coefﬁcients are larger, particularly for the most inner
distance ring. For example, ignoring the coefﬁcient of the quadratic term, for the
three-month time frame, moving from the most inner distance ring to the most
outer distance ring, the spillover effects of the restricted sample are 1.17, 0.32,
and 0.07 percentage points higher than those of the nonrestricted sample.
Almost all the past research estimated somewhat ‘‘long-term’’ spillover effects of
distressed properties for different localities during a ‘‘stable’’ housing market. The
analyses in this study pertain to a short-term effect during a ‘‘crashed’’ market.

































Exhibit 8  Three-Stage Least Squares (3SLS) Estimation of the Log of Selling Price Samples Exclude Foreclosed and REO Homes
3-Month Ring 6-Month Ring
Variables Coeff. t-Stat. Coeff. t-Stat.
No. of neighbors sold in the process of foreclosure/REO:
0–0.1 miles distance
0.0223 5.93*** 0.0204 7.22***
No. of neighbors sold in the process of foreclosure/REO:
0–0.1 miles distance squared
0.0021 3.30*** 0.0013 4.44***
No. of neighbors sold in the process of foreclosure/REO:
0.1–0.25 miles distance
0.0106 5.21*** 0.0088 6.21***
No. of neighbors sold in the process of foreclosure/REO:
0.1–0.25 miles distance squared
0.0005 3.18*** 0.0003 4.50***
No. of neighbors sold in the process of foreclosure/REO:
0.25–0.5 miles distance
0.0047 4.64*** 0.0037 5.66***
No. of neighbors sold in the process of foreclosure/REO:
0.25–0.5 miles distance squared
0.0001 3.63*** 0.0001 4.64***
Adj. R2 0.8689 0.8912
Notes: The number of observations in the 3-month ring is 6,810; the number of observations in the 6-month ring is 4,608. In addition to the included
variables, each speciﬁcation includes the house and neighborhood characteristics, vacancy status, and cash transaction indicator variables. Estimated
coefﬁcients of these variables for all speciﬁcations, as well as those for the TOM equation for the 3SLS estimation, are available upon requests.
*Signiﬁcant at the 10% level.
**Signiﬁcant at the 5% level.
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and Yao (2009). They used repeat sales data from 1990 to 2007 and estimated up
to a 36-month spillover effect of distressed properties on nondistressed sales
within four different distance rings. Comparing the results in the current study
from the ﬁrst distance ring (up to 528 feet) with the combined results to their ﬁrst
two rings (up to 300 feet and 300 to 500 feet) is perhaps the most adequate. The
highest statistically signiﬁcant spillover effect they found was three-to-six months
after foreclosure and within 300 feet, 0.52%. They also found that up to three
months after REO and within 300-to-500 feet, the spillover effect was 0.46%.
Their quadratic model also showed that the 36-month average effect within 300
feet was 0.19 (albeit declining rate), with no effect within 300–500 feet. As
expected, the short-term spillover effects during the 2008 market are larger. The
3SLS estimates, based on nonrestricted samples, produce spillover effects of
1.06% (Exhibit 6) and 0.87% (Exhibit 7) within the closest distance ring and
within three months and six months after REO, respectively. The corresponding
estimates for restricted samples (equivalent to the past research) are 2.23% and
2.04%.
Although the estimated coefﬁcients of the quadratic terms are small, the estimated
models so far indicate a nonlinear spillover effect relationship between price and
the number of distressed properties. Nonetheless, even the nonlinear speciﬁcations
provide estimates of average effects. The cumulative effects of the number of REO
properties within the 0.5 mile and within the three-month time frame are examined
to better focus on the severity of multiple distressed neighbors. In doing so, the
counts in the three distance rings were added up. Then, indicator variables were
added to the model, so houses with only one distressed property were assigned a
dummy variable equal to one, zero otherwise; houses with two distressed
properties were assigned a dummy variable equal to one, zero otherwise; and so
on. The maximum number of REOs was 56, so 56 indicators were created. The
estimated coefﬁcients of these indicators showed a relatively sharp increase up to
20 counts, relatively stable values between 21 and 35, and a ﬂuctuating pattern
thereafter. Thus, to obtain a smoother picture, individual indicators for up to 20
counts were allowed and one indicator was created for 21 to 35 and another for
36 and more. These smoothed results are plotted in Exhibit 9.
Exhibit 9 shows plots of the coefﬁcients from two 3SLS estimations; one model
does not control for the declining market trend, the second does. Both graphs
depict the same pattern. When the model controls for time trends, there is no
signiﬁcant spillover effects from the ﬁrst and second units of distressed homes in
the neighborhood. Rings with three distressed units suffer 2.5% spillover effects.
The effects continue to increase to 7.8% for rings with 20 units of distressed
homes. When time trend is not controlled for, the estimated spillover effects are
about 1.3% for rings with one unit, 2.8% for rings with two units, and 6.5% for
rings with three units. The effects continue to increase to about 18.5% for rings
with 20 units. Plots based on restricted samples, not shown here, indicate that
rings with 20 units of distressed homes experience 12.2% spillover effects when
the model includes the time trend variable and 20.8% when it is not. These202  Daneshvary, Clauretie, and Kader
Exhibit 9  Spillover Effects by Number of REO/Foreclosed Properties in the Neighborhood (Smoothed):
































Number of REO/Forclosure Neighbors 
Includes Time Trend Isolates Time Trend
Source: Estimated Coefﬁcients of REO Count Indicators.
ﬁndings indicate the importance of separating effects of overall price trends and
the contagion spillover effect of nearby distressed properties, as discussed by
Harding, Rosenblatt, and Yao (2009).
 Conclusion
Previous studies on the spillover effects of distressed properties on selling prices
of neighboring single-family homes did not include the distressed sales
observations in their analysis and did not control for distressed status and a
property’s physical condition. They also did not control for the endogenous TOM
that may affect transaction prices. Furthermore, no study ever analyzed a potential
spillover differential between sales in process of foreclosure by borrowers and
REO sales by lenders or the estimated potential spillover effect of short-sale
transactions.
Past studies’approach may be appropriate for the estimation of long-term spillover
effects under normal market conditions and time periods, with relatively small
numbers of distressed property transactions, such as in the early 2000s to 2007.
For ‘‘thin’’ markets, such as Las Vegas during 2008, when the distressed
transactions dominated the market, there was and continues to be additionalShort-Term Own-Price and Spillover Effects  203
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competition for a limited number of buyers and the estimation of short-term
spillover effects should, therefore, include all transactions, including those of
distressed properties. This study includes data for all single-family detached home
transactions in 2008 in Las Vegas, controls for the types of distressed property
status, a property’s physical condition, the market price trend, and the TOM of
each transaction. It estimates the short-term (three-month and six-month)
contemporaneous own-price discount and the spillover effects for three different
distance rings.
The empirical results show that: (1) properties sold as REO or in the process of
foreclosure, on average, cause a marginal spillover effect of about 1.06% within
0.1 miles and within three months after their transaction. The spillover effect
declines to about 0.7% to 0.4% for distances between 0.1 miles and 0.5 miles.
The six-month spillover effects are about 20% lower than those of three-month
models. Samples that exclude homes sold under distress produce up to about 58%
higher spillover effects than nonrestricted samples. The cumulative effects of
multiple distressed neighbors can be as severe as 8%. When market trend is not
controlled for, models signiﬁcantly overestimate the spillover effects. Finally,
distressed properties, including short sales, have signiﬁcantly large own-price
discounts, about 10% to 19%.
Lastly, the ﬁndings of this study suggest that short-term spillover effects of
distressed properties are much larger than pervious estimates of the same market,
Las Vegas (Harding, Rosenblatt, and Yao, 2009). It also suggests that, although
short sales suffer own-price discounts, they do not have price spillover effects on
their neighbors. This is perhaps due to relative property upkeep that may take
place when borrowers are permitted to use a short-sale process instead of a
foreclosure process. This ﬁnding has a signiﬁcant implication for lenders who
may even consider allowing borrowers to short sell to themselves, reducing
monthly mortgage payments to avoid a more costly foreclosure. It also has public-
policy implications, such as providing incentives to both lenders and borrowers
to utilize short sales. This is an important issue worthy of future research.
 Endnotes
1 In previous studies it is often not clear whether the ‘‘foreclosure’’ status referred to a
sale in the process of foreclosure or a sale as REO, or both.
2 Harding, Rosenblatt, and Yao (2009) discusses potential omitted variable bias, due to
unobserved house and neighborhood characteristics, resulting from a hedonic
speciﬁcation to estimate the spillover effects. They use repeat sales data from 1989 to
2007. The 19-year period allows them to obtain enough repeat sales observation and
estimate long-term spillover effects on price appreciation. They also acknowledge that
the repeat-sales approach assumes that there is no change in house and location
characteristics over time and that house and location attribute prices stay constant over
time. In any case, repeat-sales data are not available when dealing with a short-run
analysis. The approach would not be the best for the estimation of short-run spillover
effects.204  Daneshvary, Clauretie, and Kader
3 These studies, with the exception of Harding, Rosenblatt, and Yao (2009), which used
data from 1989 to 2007, utilized data from 1998 to 2007 and either do not include a
time boundary for spillover effects or a boundary range from a minimum of six months
to ten years.
4 In a technical term, exclusion of some observations may produce potential bias estimate
due to nonrandom sample selection (self-selection) or incidental truncation. See Green
(2008), Chapter 24.
5 For the six-month time frame analyses, observations pertaining to the ﬁrst six months
were deleted and the estimations were based on the last seven months of 2008, a total
of 14,605 observations.
6 In the ﬁrst two types of sales the title will be in the name of the borrower. Only in the
REO case will the title vest with the lender.
7 As discussed by Harding, Rosenblatt, and Yao (2009), to obtain an accurate estimate of
spillover effects it is important to isolate the effect of overall market price trends. Exhibit
3 shows an almost perfect linear declining price trend in the sample. Thus, a linear time
trend variable is included in the regression analysis.
8 As mentioned by an anonymous referee, it may be the case that expectations of future
house prices may affect the decision to default and allow a foreclosure. The default
option can be seen as a put option the value of which will change with house prices.
However, Nevada allows for deﬁciency judgments so if house prices are expected to
fall, increasing the value of the put option, there will be an offsetting increase in the
amount of the deﬁciency judgment. Further complicating the default decision is the
uncertainty of the time frame that the lender will institute a foreclosure action. As a
result, it is not likely that homeowners’ expectations of short-term price changes will
affect the default/foreclosure decisions.
9 For examples of TOM and price endogeniety studies, see Sirmans, Turnbull, and
Benjamin (1991), Yang and Yavas (1995), Yavas and Yang (1995), Knight (2002),
Harding, Knight, and Sirmans (2003), and Clauretie and Thistle (2007).
10 The numbers for within 200 feet are also calculated. Given a relatively low population
density, 4,154 square miles, in Las Vegas, the 200-feet calculation does not produce
sufﬁcient numbers of neighbors. For comparison, Schuetz, Been, and Ellen (2008) used
rings of 250 feet to 1,000 feet for New York, which has a population density of 27,440
square miles. Actual transaction date and house latitude and longitude were used to form
the rings.
11 The neighborhood variables for more than 60 ZIP Code areas come from the data that
are collected and analyzed by the Center for Business and Economic Research at the
University of Nevada, Las Vegas.
12 The Greater Las Vegas Association of Realtors (GLVAR) does not reveal the year a
broker joined the organization. Broker members, however, are given an identiﬁcation
number when they join the GLVAR. The ID number is assigned chronologically as
members join and can proxy the extent of the agent’s experience in the Las Vegas real
estate market.
13 Theoretically, best exclusionary variables for the estimation of the probit decision
equation would be some measures of owner and loan/equity characteristics, such as
employment status, accumulated equity, mortgage interest rate, etc. Unfortunately, asShort-Term Own-Price and Spillover Effects  205
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this information is extremely time-consuming to obtain, if available at all, thus,
neighborhood variables are used instead.
14 The initial analyses, based on various tests of individual and sets of coefﬁcients (t and
F test), revealed no statistically signiﬁcant differences in spillover effects of REO and
in the process of foreclosure. Thus, all reported results combine these two categories of
distressed. For simplicity, this combined category is referred to as ‘‘REO.’’
15 The initial analyses, based on various individual coefﬁcient and set of coefﬁcients (t and
F test), reveal the statistical signiﬁcance of the property’s distressed status, (F(3, 19652) 
546.9), and physical condition, (F(3, 19652)  264.8), variables. Thus, these variables are
included in all speciﬁcations.
16 Given that the dependent variable, price, is measured in natural logarithm, the precise
percentage effect of the lake view variable on price is calculated as Exp
()  1 
Exp
(0.0200)  1  1.98%. F-tests (for OLS) and chi-square tests (for 3SLS) indicate
that the estimated spillover effects differences between/among the distance rings are
statistically signiﬁcant.
17 Chi-squared tests, with one degree of freedom, for the differences between the pairs of
REO’s spillover coefﬁcients between speciﬁcations (1) and (2) are all statistically
signiﬁcant.
18 During the period under consideration, about 70% of sold houses were distressed.
Housing inventories for sale, both new and existing houses, were as high as Las Vegas
has ever seen, reducing prices by more than 40%.
19 Per an anonymous referee’s suggestion, speciﬁcation 4 was estimated for subsamples of
March–June, July–September, and September–December 2008. The estimated spillover
effect coefﬁcients were robust and stable across the subsamples.
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